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SOMETHING ELSE: SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR
BREACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS TERMS IN
SUPPLY CHAIN AGREEMENTS
JONATHAN C. LIPSON*
Contracts may include clauses designed to address human rights related conduct,
such as the treatment of a party’s employees, which are difficult to enforce. Model
Contract Clauses recently promulgated by the ABA Business Law Section Working
Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts seek
to address these challenges through innovative specific performance terms. This
Article assesses these clauses and observes that, while they are unlikely to be enforceable
in any ordinary sense, they nevertheless have value because they can induce more
constructive settlements ex post and more thoughtful bargaining, ex ante.
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“The jurisdiction of a court of equity, in decreeing a specific performance
of an agreement, is a peculiar jurisdiction, in the exercise of which that
forum becomes, of its own inherent strength, a court of conscience.”1
“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”2

INTRODUCTION
Supply chain agreements (SCAs) are central to global trade; they are
connective tissue in complex webs of relationships that have produced
profound economic growth. While SCAs present many interesting and
important legal issues, I wish to focus on a new and potentially
significant aspect of their use: implementing human rights reforms.
In particular, I will consider model contract terms (“Model Contract
Clauses,” or “MCCs”) to protect the human rights of those employed
by firms that are parties to SCAs, developed by the ABA Business Law
Section Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in
International Supply Contracts (the “Working Group”).3
From an academic perspective, the MCCs reflect a turning point in
the use of contract. We typically think of contract as a mechanism to
promote joint economic gains through shared promissory commitments.
As Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott put it, “[t]he typical contract is dyadic:
it has two parties.”4 Its law “should facilitate the efforts of contracting
parties to maximize the joint gains (the ‘contractual surplus’) from
transactions . . . [and] nothing else.”5 Using contract to address problems
1. Hudson v. King, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 560, 568 (1870).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
3. See generally David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in
International Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk, 73 BUS. LAW.
1093, 1096 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses].
4. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual
Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 325 (2015).
5. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (emphasis added).
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of human rights abuses created by economic globalization is a deliberate
effort to have contracts do “something else.”
Whether, and to what extent, mechanisms like the MCCs are able to do
“something else”—e.g., to achieve their human-rights goals—depends in
part on the efficacy of the remedies available. But traditional contract
remedies—money damages or specific relief—fit poorly in this context.
Take a simple example. Assume that U.S. buyer “B” is in a supply
chain agreement with supplier/seller “S” in a foreign nation. The SCA
makes the enforceable choice of the law of the U.S. state of B’s main
operations. Assume further that the SCA incorporates a human rights
(“HR”) term6 under which S agrees not to use “child, slave, prisoner or
any other form of forced or involuntary labor.”7 B learns from a story
in the Wall Street Journal that despite supplying conforming goods at
the agreed price, S has allegedly breached this HR term by using forced
prison labor. B’s stock price plummets.
How, if it got to that, should a court craft a remedy? Presumptively,
we start with expectation damages—the difference in value between
what S promised and what B got. Because the goods themselves
conformed to the specifications of the contract, the only material
defect involved the manner of their production. From a purely
commercial perspective, and with respect to those goods, it might be
hard to show expectation damages.
We might think that the breach caused consequential damage to B’s
reputation. But quantifying reputational harm flowing from breach of
contract is difficult for courts.8 If B’s shares were publicly traded, we might
think that a drop in price on the news is a plausible proxy for reputational
damage. But many factors contribute to the rise and fall of share prices
and, in any case, B is not likely to own most of the shares in question. Its

6. Like the Working Group, I focus mostly on labor-related human rights (HR)
terms. I note, however, that the MCCs could apply to substantive terms for a range of
social, economic, and environmental problems.
7. This language derives from a term developed by General Motors. See AntiSlavery and Human Trafficking Statement, GEN. MOTORS CO., https://www.gm.com/
content/dam/company/archive/docs/legal/General_Motors_Company_Anti_Slaver
y_And_Human_Trafficking_Statement.pdf (last visited June 1, 2019) (emphasis omitted)
(“Seller further represents that neither it nor any of its subcontractors, vendors, agents or
other associated third parties will utilize child, slave, prisoner or any other form of forced
or involuntary labor, or engage in abusive employment or corrupt business practices, in the
supply of goods or provision of services under this Contract.” (emphasis omitted)).
8. See Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (stating that calculating reputational damages may be speculative and unascertainable).
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shareholders will, but they are not parties to the SCA, even though they
may be the ones ultimately harmed by B’s now-tainted reputation.
These and similar problems may have led the drafters of the MCCs to
consider specific performance and injunctive relief (collectively
“specific relief”) to be attractive alternatives (or supplements) to money
damages.9 Thus, the MCCs provide that remedies for breach of HR terms
may include: (1) an injunction enforcing the HR term; (2) B’s right to
require S to remove problematic employees or “Representatives” of S; and
(3) B’s right to require S to terminate contracts with sub-suppliers.10
But specific relief is also problematic, especially under U.S. law, which
tends to view it as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”11
Courts seem no more inclined to grant it for claims of reputational harm
than to award money damages.12 While a court can back up such an
order with contempt powers,13 it is unclear how effective those powers
are, especially against defendants who may be in foreign nations. In any
case, if a U.S. court orders S to take action specifically contemplated by
the contract—e.g., to fire an employee or change its employment
practices—how will it know whether S has complied? If the harm to B is
reputational, isn’t B’s better solution to end the contract now and buy
from someone else, meaning partial rescission? Uncertainty about these
remedial paths may lead multinational corporations (MNCs) to wonder
why they should bother with the MCCs on specific relief at all.
This Article tries to address these questions by assessing the efficacy of
the Model Contract Clauses’ specific relief terms in two steps. First, I
note that the MCCs are unlikely to be enforceable in any ordinary sense
9. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, ¶ 5.3.
10. Id. §§ 1.1, 5.3, at 1097, 1102–03. See infra Part I.B (defining “Representatives”).
11. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (referring to
preliminary injunctions). Courts make similar statements about specific performance.
See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939, 944 (Idaho 1978) (stating
that specific performance is a remedy only used when other remedies are not adequate).
I focus only on U.S. law. I note that civil law systems may be more receptive to specific
relief than common law systems. Henrik Lando & Caspar Rose, On the Enforcement of Specific
Performance in Civil Law Countries, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 473, 474 nn.6–7 (2004). They
do, however, add a layer of complexity beyond the scope of this Article.
12. Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., 528 F.3d 176, 178–79
(3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff in a breach of contract case cannot convert monetary
harm into irreparable harm simply by claiming that the breach of contract has
prevented it from performing contracts with others and that this subsequent failure to
perform will harm the plaintiff’s reputation.”).
13. Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
382, 389 (1983) (discussing the “specter of civil and criminal contempt” for disobeying
a federal injunction).
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because they may induce two anxieties that have long troubled judges
asked to impose specific relief: the anxiety of indenture and the anxiety
of entanglement. The former, indenture, is most problematic when
courts are asked to order a person to do (or to refrain from doing)
something, as and to the extent the “something” starts to look like
involuntary servitude.14 The latter, entanglement, reflects judicial
concerns about interfering with matters that are personal to the parties or
that are political, such as value choice or the “public interest.”15 These
anxieties of indenture and entanglement will constrain and channel the
judicial imagination in crafting specific relief for the breach of HR terms.
These limitations might lead parties to eschew HR terms in SCAs. My
second point is that they should not. Rather, parties and courts should
see that granting specific relief for breach of HR terms shares important
aspirations with the injunctive relief courts grant in institutional reform
litigation, lawsuits in which beneficiaries of public programs or agencies
have sued to reform and restructure those agencies.16 Although not a
perfect analogy, courts in those cases have developed experimental
techniques such as monitoring and the use of neutral experts as forms of
specific relief that could be adapted to cases involving breach of HR terms.
Thus, parties seeking to use HR terms in supply chain agreements (and
perhaps future iterations of the Model Contract Clauses) might include
some of those techniques, including the appointment of monitors,
trainers, and other quality assurance mechanisms.
At the same time, specific relief terms often improve performance
under relational contracts such as SCAs,17 and this should be true of HR
terms within them. Negotiating such terms may impose transaction costs,
but the terms should have the transaction benefits of compelling parties
to think more deliberately about whether they can make human rights
related promises, and, if they do so, how they can be performed. In the
event of breach, the threat of specific relief tends to have a clarifying effect

14. See infra Section II.B.
15. Political entanglement may be especially worrisome. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1979) (“[T]he issue is not shrewdness, not the
capacity of judges to devise strategies for dealing with these limiting forces, but rather the
very need to devise these strategies and what the perception of this need does to their sense
of independence. Judges realize that practical success vitally depends on the preferences,
the will, of the body politic.”). I discuss the anxiety of entanglement as it pertains to claims
of religious liberty in Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms,
84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 593 (2000).
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See infra Section III.B.

1756

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1751

that promotes more efficient negotiated resolution, especially among
parties who wish to preserve their commercial relationship.18
The bottom line, then, is that the Model Contract Clauses’ specific
relief provisions are innovative ways to solve difficult social problems
created or exacerbated by globalization.
While they may be
problematic to enforce as currently written, they can have important,
practical value that parties who are serious about addressing human
rights problems should consider.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides brief
background on the Model Contract Clauses, and why globalization has
created demand for them. Part II addresses some doctrinal challenges
that the MCCs may present under U.S. law, and how those doctrinal
challenges mask anxieties of indenture and entanglement. Part III
acknowledges these challenges but suggests that such terms
nevertheless have value as mechanisms to structure consent decrees in
the event of litigation and, in any case, may productively channel the
parties’ relationship regarding human rights and similar issues.
I. BACKGROUND—GOVERNANCE GAPS IN GLOBAL TRADE
& THE MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES
The benefits of globalization are well understood—chiefly in the
form of increased wealth for more people. But, globalization has costs
as well, articulated as problems of social, economic, and environmental
responsibility (“SEER”). These costs are often attributed to “governance
gaps,” in John Ruggie’s words:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization—between the
scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of
societies to manage their adverse consequences. These governance
gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation.
How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human
rights is our fundamental challenge.19

SEER problems have often been viewed as problems that government
must solve. But of course, there is no global government, and
conventional, self-seeking strategies may create long-term externalities.

18. See infra Section III.B.
19. John Ruggie, Special Rep. of the Sec’y Gen., Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).

2019]

SPECIFIC RELIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1757

A great deal of global economic activity is undertaken by MNCs, and
such corporations may for many purposes be “stateless.”20 Among other
things, this means that they will have an enhanced capacity to evade or
arbitrage regulation intended to solve SEER problems. Unless MNCs
choose to cooperate, it will be difficult to achieve many SEER goals.
Some MNCs have chosen to cooperate in addressing at least some
SEER problems through statements of corporate social responsibility
(CSR).21 Corporate law scholars have invested considerable energy
debating the merits of CSR. Optimists such as Merrick Dodd,22 David
Million,23 and Lyman Johnson,24 have argued that corporations can
and should act for the benefit of all who are affected by the
corporation’s activities, not merely their shareholders. Corporations
have a duty, in other words, to be socially responsible. Others, such as
Milton Friedman,25 Jonathan Macey,26 and Adolph Berle see CSR as
naïve—little more than a “pious wish that something nice will come
out of it all,” as Berle famously put it.27

20. Hany H. Makhlouf, Multinational Corporations and Nation-States: Managing Sharedand Conflicts of Interest, 4 J. SOC. & ADMIN. SCI. 139, 141 (2017) (noting that a multinational
corporation resembles “a federation of different companies or semi-autonomous
subsidiaries that are, at least, partially owned and controlled by a central unit”).
21. Corporate social responsibility reflects “the economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary/philanthropic expectations society places on organizations at a given
point in time.” ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ & ARCHIE B. CARROLL, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY:
ETHICS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 34 (9th ed. 2015).
22. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1160–61 (1932) (arguing in support of corporate social responsibility).
23. David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 523, 524 (2011) (developing models of corporate social responsibility).
24. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2012) (“[C]orporate law today
has little to say about a subject of great societal significance—corporate responsibility.”).
25. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 2–3 (describing corporate social responsibility as
“taxation without representation” and equating the use of social values, other than
profit maximization, in business decision making as “socialist”).
26. Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Economics Perspective,
17 CHAP. L. REV. 331, 332 (2014) (arguing that shareholder interests are presumptively
primary and exclusive of interests of other stakeholders).
27. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1368 (1932). In the law and economics literature, the base cite is typically
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), which developed the
theory of shareholder primacy as a function of agency costs.
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Efforts to use corporate law to induce MNCs to internalize the costs of
globalization have had little legal success.28 The Working Group that drafted
the Model Contract Clauses appears to understand this, and views contract
terms as a way to help fill the governance gaps identified by Ruggie.29
A. The Model Contract Clauses
The Model Contract Clauses seek to put teeth into CSR by providing
contract processes that would implement such human rights standards
as the ABA Model Business and Supplier Principles on Labor
Trafficking and Child Labor (the “Principles”).30 “The hope,” the
Working Group explained, “is that following the steps outlined in the
ABA Model Principles will help eradicate labor trafficking and child
labor from supply chains, making a difference to real people—their
health, safety, and freedom, and in some cases, saving lives.”31
Although motivated by concerns about human rights abuses in the
global supply chain, the MCCs do not specify the substance of those rights.
Rather, they leave those to the parties in specific cases, to be incorporated
in the contract in what the Working Group refers to as a “Schedule P.”32
In principle, the Model Contract Clauses could provide redress for
violation of any substantive terms that seek to solve SEER problems.
B. Model Contract Clauses as a Contract for Procedure
While the Model Contract Clauses do not specify substantive SEER
goals, they do offer a series of mechanisms for increasing the likelihood

28. See, e.g., Order Denying Def.’s Joint Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2, Nat’l Consumers League
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22,
2016) (finding that statements of corporate policy are merely “aspirational in nature”).
29. See Ruggie, supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Model Contract Clauses, supra
note 3, at 1094 (“The foundational idea behind the present work is to move the commitments
that companies require, whatever they may be, from corporate policy statements to the actual
contract documents where those policies may have greater impact.”).
30. For a discussion of the Principles, see, for example, E. Christopher Johnson, Jr.,
Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks
Involving Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS. LAW. 1083 (2015); see also ABA Model
Business and Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, ABA (Jan. 9, 2019),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/initiatives_awards/child_labor.
31. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1094.
32. “Whatever moral and legal commitments companies want to require can be
accommodated in what this Working Group entitles Schedule P, which the model
clauses incorporate, but the actual content of Schedule P is beyond the scope of this
Working Group.” Id. at 1096. Schedule P was chosen as a reference to the principles
that might supply or animate the substantive standards in question. Id. at 1096 n.13.
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that parties achieve these goals by making them central to the SCA itself.
Sellers under the MCCs would represent and warrant that they—and
their “Representatives” (defined below)—have complied with Schedule P33
and that compliance with Schedule P is a “material” term of the
agreement.34 Noncompliance with Schedule P would, under the MCCs,
“substantially impair[] the value of the Goods and this Agreement to Buyer”
and would constitute “a fundamental breach of the entire Agreement.”35
There are two gating issues with these provisions. First, it is not clear
whether or how a supplier (e.g., S, in the example from the
Introduction) can assure that its suppliers and Representatives have
complied with Schedule P. The Model Contract Clauses define a
“Representative” as potentially including “shareholders/partners,
officers, directors, employees, and agents of Supplier and all
intermediaries, subcontractors, consultants and any other person
providing staffing for Goods or services required by this Agreement on
behalf of Supplier.”36 The goal appears to be to assure that the norms
and values reflected in Schedule P are driven through S to all in some
material relationship with S, including its suppliers.
This, in principle, is a laudable goal. Supply chains can be quite
long. But one has to ask whether it is realistic to expect suppliers to
know what their suppliers’ suppliers are up to? In a footnote, the
Model Contract Clauses observe that an unqualified version of this
definition “supports [the] Buyer’s goals to allocate the risk of
undiscovered issues to Supplier and contractually encourage Supplier
to gather accurate information about its subcontractors.”37 Whether,
or to what extent, it is realistic to think that a tier one supplier can do
so as to its suppliers, its sub-suppliers, and so on, is another matter.
Moreover, given the breadth of the definition, one might wonder whether
it includes those in legally protected relationships with S, such as its
attorneys. Is S’s counsel a “Representative” under the Model Contract

33. Id. at 1097 (“Supplier and its subcontractors and [to Supplier’s [best] knowledge]
the [shareholders/partners, officers, directors, employees, and] agents of Supplier and all
intermediaries, subcontractors, consultants and any other person providing staffing for
Goods or services required by this Agreement [on behalf of Supplier] (collectively, the
‘Representatives’) are in compliance with Schedule P.”) (alterations in original).
34. Id. at 1099 (“It is a material term of this Agreement that Supplier and
Representatives shall strictly comply with Schedule P.”).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1097 (alterations omitted).
37. Id. at 1097 n.15.
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Clauses? The broad definition suggests they might be, but they may be
surprised to learn that.
Second, the Model Contract Clauses treat the breach of the HR term
(Schedule P) as a breach of terms that would otherwise involve the
goods, themselves. This is probably a necessary, but perhaps
problematic, strategy because, as discussed below, specific remedies
may not involve the goods at all. Rather, the breach of Schedule P
probably involves the process of their production.
Nevertheless, the Model Contract Clauses appear to assume that
they would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG).38 But those laws were drafted not with a view toward
affecting the behavior and norms of parties to contracts involving the
sales of goods, but instead to provide default rules regarding the sale
of the goods, themselves, e.g., as to their quality, quantity, price, and
legal title.39 Because the substance of Schedule P may have nothing to
do with the characteristics of the goods, and because specific relief for
the breach of Schedule P may not, either, it is not difficult to imagine
disagreement over whether either of those bodies of law apply to these
aspects of the Model Contract Clauses.
C. Specific Relief under the Model Contract Clauses
I point these issues out not to quibble with the Model Contract
Clauses, but instead to frame the challenges underlying what are
perhaps their most innovative features—their forms of specific relief.
As one might expect, most of the remedial terms in the Model
Contract Clauses involve money. The MCCs provide for, among other
things, liquidated damages,40 damage due to lost sales (profit) and/or
to reputational harm, and indemnification for B’s losses due to S’s

38. Id. at 1096 (“The text proposed assumes that buyers are located in the United
States and that the applicable law is the Uniform Commercial Code (the ‘U.C.C.’) or
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the
‘CISG,’ a treaty to which the United States is a party).”); see also United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 45–52, 61–65, Apr.
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59, 67–69, 70–71 [hereinafter CISG].
39. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“The
arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and the various steps
of its performance.”); Id. § 2-102 (“Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
applies to transactions in goods.”).
40. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1103 (“[T]he parties have therefore
agreed to liquidated damages in an amount calculated as follows: _______________.”).
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breach of Schedule P.41 The MCCs candidly recognize, however, that
the “[b]uyer may face challenges with respect to proving damages.
This is common in claims for breach of contract, but Buyer may have
special challenges with respect to the impact on its brand that results
from violations of human rights policies.”42 Moreover, collecting
money judgments against a foreign promisor may be difficult.
The Model Contract Clauses contain three provisions articulating
specific relief:
(1) First, they would have the Supplier agree that, in the event of a
breach of Schedule P, Buyer may “obtain an injunction with respect
to Supplier’s noncompliance with Schedule P, and the parties agree
that noncompliance with Schedule P causes Buyer great and
irreparable harm for which Buyer has no adequate remedy at law
and that the public interest would be served by injunctive and other
equitable relief.”43 (“Model Contract Clauses Injunction”).
(2) Second, the Supplier would agree that the Buyer may “require Supplier
to remove an employee or employees and/or other Representatives.”44
(“Model Contract Clauses Employee/Representative Termination”).
(3) Third, the Supplier would agree that the Buyer may “require
Supplier to terminate a subcontract.” (“Model Contract Clauses
Subcontract Termination” and, with the Model Contract Clauses
Employee/Representative Termination,” the “Termination Powers”).45

While it is difficult to know, empirically, whether these sorts of terms
are truly novel in supply chain agreements, it is not difficult to imagine
that they will be challenging for courts to enforce by way of injunction
or specific performance, which I explain in the next Part.
II. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Model Contract Clauses appear to contemplate both specific
performance and injunctive relief, although they articulate only the
latter directly. We tend to think that specific performance and
injunctive relief are the same, legal substitutes for one another.46 And,
41. Id. at 1103–04.
42. Id. at 1103 n.42.
43. Id. at 1102.
44. Id. at 1103.
45. Id.
46. See Engemoen v. Rea, 26 F.2d 576, 578 (8th Cir. 1928) (“An injunction decree
enjoining the breach of a contract is in effect a decree for its specific performance,
and the principles which govern the granting of both remedies are generally the
same.”); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 11:36 (2018)
(“One can readily see that an injunction may well be the reverse side of the coin of
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while they overlap significantly in their necessary elements and their
functions, they are not coterminous. Instead, they appear to be
doctrinally distinct in two respects that might matter to courts asked to
enforce them in this context and to parties that consider using them.
A. Doctrine and its Limits
Contract doctrine conventionally presumes that specific performance
is an “exceptional remedy,”47 to be granted only if damages would not
be adequate.48 U.S. courts will grant specific performance in cases where
the aggrieved party can show that goods are “unique” or in “other
proper circumstances.”49 The underlying logic of specific performance
derives from the view that substitutionary remedies—money damages—
will usually be adequate. As Farnsworth put it, “[o]ur system of contract
remedies is not directed at the compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach; it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”50
The principal point of doctrinal overlap between specific
performance, as a contract remedy, and injunctive relief is “adequacy”:
Both remedies are said to be limited to circumstances where money
damages would be “inadequate.” In the case of injunctions, the element
is referred to as “irreparable injury,”51 but it has substantially the same
import: a court must do something, the claimant says, because money
itself will not be a sufficient substitute.
Yet, “adequacy” is a problematic standard. The classic case for specific
performance of a contract term—conveying title to real property—is not

specific performance: forbidding a party from taking an action may well be all the
performance that a party expects.”).
47. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1016 (2005).
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357, 359–60, 366–67 (AM. LAW INST.
1979) (stating it is within the court’s discretion to decide if damages would not be adequate).
49. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Specific Performance of Sale of Goods Under UCC § 2-716,
26 A.L.R.4th § 2[a] (1983); see also Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look
at the Doctrine of Specific Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 697, 701
(2005) (“It is also important to note that the general trend in U.S. contract law favors
increased latitude for trial courts to grant specific performance as a redress for breach.”).
50. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
51. To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must in theory show:
[1] Success (or, in the case of a preliminary injunction, likely success) on the merits;
[2] Irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief;
[3] The balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor; and
[4] An injunction is “in the public interest.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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necessarily one in which money damages are inadequate. Deriving a
dollar value for the property in question may be difficult, but it is not
obviously more speculative than deriving damages in cases where the
aggrieved party is a new business that lacks a track record of
profitability.52 Conversely, the case in which money damages would be
highly inadequate—breach of a personal services contract—is one in
which a court would almost certainly not order specific performance.53
Not surprisingly, analysts view the adequacy standard skeptically.
Melvin Eisenberg considered “inadequacy” as a predicate to obtaining
specific performance to be a “virtually dead” rule.54 Those who study
equitable remedies say much the same. Douglas Laycock, for example,
has argued that the “irreparable injury” standard:
does not describe what the cases do, and it cannot account for the
results. Injunctions are routine, and damages are never adequate
unless the court wants them to be. Courts can freely turn to the
precedents granting injunctions or the precedents denying
injunctions, depending on whether they want to hold the legal
remedy adequate or inadequate. Whether they want to hold the
legal remedy adequate depends on whether they have some other
reason to deny the equitable remedy, and it is these other reasons
that drive the decisions.55

52. See Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283, 291 (Haw. 1980) (finding that
recovery should not be denied simply because the business is new so long as the
plaintiff can show future profits with reasonable certainty).
53. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 1017, 1036 (“[A] decree ordering an employee to
specifically perform an employment contract would seem too much like involuntary servitude
or peonage.”); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 169
(1991) (“The reason for [the rule that employment contracts will not be specifically enforced
against employees] is a substantive law commitment to free labor. Despite the vast social
distance between chattel slavery and specific performance of contracts with professional
athletes and entertainers, similar policies apply to both . . . . An order to work on pain of
contempt produces servitude that is involuntary when the services are performed.”).
54. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 1017 (“The adequacy rule, as a rule that
simply bars the gate, is virtually dead and probably should be. The commentators also
generally agree that specific performance is granted more freely today than traditional
doctrine suggests.”), with Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REV. 687, 703 (1990) (“Damages are inadequate if plaintiff cannot use them
to replace the specific thing he has lost. This is by far the most important rule in
determining the doctrinal relationship among remedies.”).
55. Laycock, supra note 54, at 692.
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B. “Other Reasons” for and Against Specific Relief
This, then, invites the question: What are those other reasons? One
way to answer the question is to map four inchoate, but important,
factors underlying the substantive or policy disputes at issue. These
are whether the specific relief sought is (1) affirmative or (2) negative;
and whether it involves (3) persons or (4) property.
SUBJECT
MATTER/RELIEF
PROPERTY56
PERSONS

NEGATIVE

AFFIRMATIVE

Attachment/lien;57
enjoin infringement58
Enjoin harmful
conduct (e.g.,
impermissible
competition)

Transfer title
Order personal
services59

Plotting specific relief in this way helps to reveal, and perhaps helps
to explain, two anxieties that seem to constrain judges who are asked
to grant specific relief: the anxiety of indenture and the anxiety of
entanglement. The anxiety of indenture reflects the deeply-held belief
that specific performance is inappropriate in personal services
contracts on free-labor grounds. Having abolished slavery, any effort
56. This functional analysis would comport with the trend toward recognizing that
equitable power—the power to enjoin or order performance—reaches both persons and
property. Historically, it was limited to property. Shreve, supra note 13, at 386 (“Until
recently, equity’s protections were confined to property as opposed to personal rights.”).
57. I note that it is not clear whether an attachment or similar judicial lien would
be a legal or equitable remedy. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 214 (2002) (characterizing a claim for restitution under ERISA as “restitution
that . . . is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on
particular property—but legal—the imposition of personal liability for the benefits
that they conferred upon respondents”).
58. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806 (3d Cir.
1998) (discussing “irreparable harm [that] Hardee’s and MRO would continue to
suffer as a result of Pappan’s non-consensual use of the ROY ROGERS [trade]marks”).
59. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974) (relying on “the traditional
unwillingness of courts of equity to enforce contracts for personal service either at the
behest of the employer or of the employee”); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (7th Cir.
1894) (holding that a decree of specific performance for breach of an employment
contract would be involuntary servitude); The Case of Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. 122, 123,
126 (Ind. 1821) (denying specific enforcement of a promise to serve employer for
twenty years); Laycock, supra note 54, at 745 (stating that the court will not grant
specific performance for personal services contracts).
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to order a person to perform a promised service may look like
peonage—a shameful condition abetted by long-discredited judges.60
As Laycock has observed, “the difficulty of coercing close personal
relationships is a powerful reason for denying specific relief, even if
damage remedies are inadequate.”61
The anxiety of entanglement stems from fears that judges cannot
plausibly intervene in the day-to-day work and lives of parties. As
Schwartz has noted, “specific performance [is] an unattractive remedy
in cases in which the promisor’s performance is complex, because the
promisor is more likely to render a defective performance when that
performance is coerced, and the defectiveness of complex
performances is sometimes difficult to establish in court.”62 Even the
most Herculean judge cannot get off the bench and run the company.63

60. The Peonage Cases addressed the problem that arose after Reconstruction of
southern courts convicting African Americans of a “crime” derived from breach of a debt
or other contract and indenturing them to the creditor as the remedy. See, e.g., Pollock
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911). Although Congress had forbidden peonage in the
wake of the Civil War (Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012))), southern courts continued to defy
it. See United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944) (reversing a lower court
holding that one could not be convicted under the Anti-Peonage Act for merely arresting
someone with the intent of returning them to peonage). See generally William Wirt Howe,
The Peonage Cases, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1904) (discussing lower court decisions under
federal Anti-Peonage Act). Some judges have suggested that involuntary servitude had
to be akin to slavery in the specific sense of subjecting workers to physical or legal
coercion. See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional
Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1514 (2010).
61. Laycock, supra note 54, at 748.
62. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 277 (1979).
Perhaps the most articulate expression of this anxiety arose in connection with federal
efforts to enjoin steelworker strikes in the 1950s:
No doubt a District Court is normally charged with the duty of independently
shaping the details of a decree when sitting in equity in controversies that involve
simple and relatively few factors—factors, that is, far less in number, less
complicated and less interrelated than in the case before us. But a court is not
qualified to devise schemes for the conduct of an industry so as to assure the
securing of necessary defense materials. It is not competent to sit in judgment
on the existing distribution of factors in the conduct of an integrated industry
to ascertain whether it can be segmented with a view to its reorganization for the
supply exclusively, or even primarily, of government-needed materials.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 50–51 (1959) (Frankfurter
& Harlan, JJ., concurring) (per curiam).
63. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986) (discussing the approach of a
hypothetical “Herculean” judge to judicial action). Interestingly, although there is
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These anxieties are most severe in the lower right-hand quadrant of the
figure above; and mildest in the upper left. In some cases, the specific
relief envisioned by the MCCs may take judges closer to the lower righthand zone than they would like. In that case, they would be unlikely to
enforce such terms. The balance of this Part explains why; the following
Part offers some alternative ways of thinking about the work that the
MCCs, or other specific relief provisions, can perform in this context.
C. Doctrinal Distinctions
The anxieties of indenture and entanglement have no strong
doctrinal locus, even as they may matter to judges asked to enforce (or
to refrain from enforcing) provisions like the MCCs. Doctrinally, courts
at least talk as if “adequacy” is the central question for both specific
performance and injunctions, though the adequacy in question is that of
the remedy, and not of the court’s capacity to effectuate it. Still, there are
doctrinal distinctions between injunction and specific performance that
should matter in the context of HR terms, in part because judges may use
them to attempt to manage these anxieties. This Part looks at some of the
salient doctrinal distinctions in this context.
1.

“Other proper circumstances”—specific relief and supply chain agreements
Specific performance would appear to be easier to obtain than an
injunction, as and to the extent it does not induce concerns about
judicial compulsion of services or entanglement in personal
relations.64 To obtain specific performance under the UCC, for
example, the plaintiff need only show under section 2-716 that goods

ample literature on Dworkin’s famous enthusiasm for the wisdom and power of judges,
see, for example, W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the
Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 79–80 (2017), none of it seems to focus on the
mechanism by which judges would most directly exercise that power, specific relief.
Perhaps this reflects Dworkin’s interest in “serious” matters of constitutional
interpretation, as distinct from seemingly more trivial matters of contract enforcement.
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (analyzing different
rights from a philosophy of law approach). I leave that project to another day.
64. See Nemer Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Corp., 992 F.2d 430, 433 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing Travellers Int’l AG v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1087, 1104
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (observing that test for specific performance is “more flexible” than
the test for a preliminary injunction). See generally Shreve, supra note 13, at 387 (“The
injunction does occupy an inferior hierarchical position in the law of remedies. In an
action for damages, plaintiff need not establish that the harm he suffers is substantial.
To obtain an injunction, however, plaintiff must show that the equitable remedy is
necessary to avert substantial harm.”).
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are “unique” or that there are “other proper circumstances.”65 Because
we can assume that the goods in most cases involving the MCCs will
not be unique, the questions are whether breach of an HR term
constitutes “other proper circumstances” and how high a hurdle that
sets for a plaintiff-buyer.
It is safe to say that the drafters of section 2-716 probably did not have HR
terms in mind when they used the words “other proper circumstances.”
Section 2-716 “seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts
have shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of
sale.”66 But, the main example given is the inability to cover—meaning that
the focus is on the goods and not the conditions under which they were
produced.67
Where no market alternative is “adequate,” specific
performance would be “other proper circumstances.”
Thus, while courts may order sellers to perform under long-term supply
contracts, they may also worry about their real power to do so. Courts are
not necessarily unwilling to enforce such terms merely because they
involve repeat performance.68 But, as Nathan Oman has observed,
“specific performance represents a greater intrusion into personal
freedom than do money damages,”69 and this certainly seems to be true
in long-term supply contracts. Although there appear to be no published
opinions involving injunctions for breach of HR terms, case law suggests
that courts are uncomfortable granting injunctions when the court faces
the prospect of long-term engagement with the defendant.70

65. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
66. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 1.
67. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 2 (“[I]nability to cover is strong evidence of ‘other proper
circumstances.’”).
68. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 39–40 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding
that a long-term contract makes it difficult to estimate damages and specific performance
offers an efficient way to attain the ends of justice); Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex
Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing that unique goods are an
exception to the general rule that limits specific performance as a remedy).
69. Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 869 (2007).
70. Soinco v. NKAP provides an illustrative example outside the UCC. See Soinco v.
NKAP, Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK 273/95 ¶ 173 (May 31,
1996), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html (providing an example of a
long-term supply contract). Here, an international arbitration set in Zurich
determined that there was no basis for claims of specific performance in Russian law,
and so the buyer’s claim for specific performance was denied. The buyers requested
specific performance of several contracts of sale; if ordered, the seller, a Russian
aluminum producer, would have had to produce and deliver aluminum to the buyers
for between eight and ten years. Id. ¶ 349. The tribunal found that it “fail[ed] to see
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Conversely, if the problem could easily be cashed out, any intrusion
by the court into a party’s operations may be problematic. In Healthcare
Corp. of America v. Data Rx Management, Inc.,71 for example, a healthcare claims management company allegedly held funds that should
have been remitted to a pharmacy benefits provider pursuant to a
supply chain agreement.72 Although the management company did
not dispute that it held the funds that it owed to the benefits provider,73
the court declined to grant the injunction:
Data Rx has alleged that the trust on which its supply chain is based will
erode if a preliminary injunction is not granted. It has not, however,
(1) presented any sworn statements from pharmacies stating that such
a chilling effect is taking place, or (2) differentiated this supply chain
from any other where suppliers take on financial risk by dispensing
products in advance of receiving payment. In short, Data Rx has not
submitted proof of loss of reputation or demonstrated that its pharmacy
network is different from “other types of commerce in such a way that
normal breach of contract remedies could not provide a remedy.”74

The court in Data Rx recognized that the benefits provider, the party
seeking the injunction, may well have had a claim, but denied the
injunction because liability could easily be established at a later point
in the litigation, and it apparently faced no collection risk in the event

how specific performance could be an appropriate remedy for buyers in this case”
because “[the buyers] can hardly expect to be able, under the New York Convention
or otherwise, to have an award enforced in Russia . . . for the next eight or ten
years . . . .” Id. The tribunal denied the buyer’s claim for specific performance because
ordering performance would require constant supervision, and thus confirmed that
difficulty of enforcement would influence a court’s decision to order specific
performance under the CISG. See id. ¶¶ 348–49; see also Nayiri Boghossian, A
Comparative Study of Specific Performance Provisions in the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 65 (Nov. 1999)
(unpublished Master of Laws thesis, McGill University), https://www.collectionscanad
a.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ64262.pdf.
71. No. 2:12-2910 (KM), 2013 WL 1314736 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013).
72. See id. at *1.
73. Id. at *4 (“HCA does not meaningfully dispute that it is holding a significant
amount of money due to pharmacies who are not parties to this action. HCA concedes
that Data Rx has sent invoices for the Pharmacy Charges and Processing Fee, and it
has conceded at oral argument that it does not challenge the amount of these invoices.
HCA admits that it has been paid by Middlesex County for past prescriptions filled by
the pharmacies. HCA has not turned these funds over to Data Rx.”).
74. Id. at *5 (quoting Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP,
528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008)).
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it won.75 Moreover, the request for the preliminary injunction was
made as part of a counterclaim to a complaint alleging breach of one or
more of “numerous” contracts that governed the parties’ relationships.76
It is not difficult to imagine that the lower court here did not wish to
become entangled in the complex relationships of the parties, especially
when it did not need to do so.
This is not to suggest that buyers could never specifically enforce HR
terms on a theory that they present “other proper circumstances.” I mean
only that courts may worry about their ability to do so without becoming
impermissibly entangled in the affairs of the parties, or required to
indenture persons over whom they have little, if any, direct control.
Consider a variation on the example from the Introduction. Assume
that S employs a manager “M” who knows that S has agreed not to use
prison labor under its SCA with B. Yet, M also knows that he cannot
provide the promised goods at the promised price without using belowmarket labor, and so he leases inmates from a nearby prison, in breach
of the SCA. Assume further that B learns of this and demands that S
terminate M pursuant to a provision akin to the Termination Powers in
the Model Contract Clauses. S refuses to terminate M. Then what?
Would a U.S. court order a promisor (S) to terminate an employee who,
in S’s judgment, has not committed an offense that creates grounds for
termination? How could S do so without avoiding the risk of collateral
litigation for wrongful termination or interference from M?77
It is hard to know what to do with any of the standard doctrinal tests
on these facts. It is easy to see that money damages might be
inadequate, but that hardly tells a court how to balance the equities or
otherwise to achieve some rough justice. Indeed, it is not hard to
imagine a judge being very reluctant to provide affirmative relief
75. E.g., id. at *1 ("That is not to say that Data Rx's claims could not prevail on summary
judgment or at trial, but at present, they do not furnish a basis for injunctive relief.”); id. at
*5 (noting that counsel represented that following an anticipated sale of the counterclaimdefendant, “the combined company is projected to have significantly greater revenues than
HCA alone”). The Data Rx court’s conclusion was also motivated in part by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Grupo Mexicano that a preliminary injunction should not ordinarily issue
for a breach of contract claim, even where the defendant may be preferentially transferring
assets in anticipation of the litigation. Id. at *4 (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.
v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999)).
76. Id. at *2 (observing that the parties’ “relationships are governed by numerous
contracts”).
77. If M were a "key" employee, the problem would be even more complicated.
For a discussion on the enforceability of “key man” clauses generally, see In re Orion
Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993).
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because enforcing these terms might enmesh a judge in complex
personnel matters. While B may believe that the normative force of
the underlying dispute constitutes “other proper circumstances,” it is
easy to see why a court may disagree. Anxieties of indenture and
entanglement are likely to be high, here.
2.

The “public interest” and specific relief
A second, and perhaps more interesting, doctrinal difference
between specific performance and injunctive relief appears to involve
the role of the “public interest.” There is no formal requirement that
courts entertaining a request for specific performance of a contract
term consider the “public interest.” By contrast, when courts consider
whether to grant (or deny) injunctive relief (especially preliminary
injunctions), they may do so.78
At one level, the difference is not surprising, since we typically
assume that breach of contract problems are largely “private” in
nature.79 While a few courts have considered the public’s interest in
granting specific performance, they appear to be the exception.80 If
the “public interest” is an element of a party’s request for specific
performance, it will be because it is a predicate to the enforceability of
the substantive term, such as a covenant not to compete,81 and not
necessarily of the remedy.
Because specific relief is typically viewed as emanating from a court’s
equity power, public interest and specific relief have long been linked
and debated. The alliance has roots in the Supreme Court’s statement
in 1937 that “[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are

78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In
granting [injunctive] relief, as well as in denying it, a court may take into consideration
the public interest.”).
79. See, e.g., Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d at 1097 (demonstrating the breach of
contract dispute between Orion and Showtime, private parties); see also Daniel
Markovitz, Theories of the Common Law of Contracts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contracts-theories.
80. See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Louisville, 126 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Ky. 1939)
(ordering the railroad to specifically perform the contract to make grade crossing safe
in support of the public interest).
81. DJR Assocs., LLC v. Hammonds, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (noting
that when considering whether to grant injunction, the court observed that “the enforceability
of non-compete covenants touches on the conflicting fundamental public policies of many
states”).

2019]

SPECIFIC RELIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1771

involved.”82 A leading treatise observes that the “public interest”
element of injunctive relief “is another way of inquiring whether there
are policy considerations that bear on whether the order should
issue.”83 Even within the sphere of private ordering, observers have
argued that courts should account for the moral and policy
implications of using specific performance.84
This both frames the central issue in the enforcement of HR terms,
and invites difficult questions. One of the key problems with such
terms will be their “public” character. Because they involve or affect
persons who are not parties to the contract, they may require an
assessment of interests that differ from those in ordinary contract
disputes, and that may differ from those of the parties to the contract.
Whose public interest are we talking about—the buyer’s, the seller’s or
the seller’s employees? How is a court supposed to select and, once it
does so, how is a court supposed to know what the interest is? If, as
seems likely in a global supply chain agreement, the employees at issue
are in a foreign nation, how is a court in the United States (whether a
state court or a U.S. district court in diversity) supposed to know what
the public interest is there? Surely, it cannot be the same as the public
interest in the United States.
Consider, again, the example from the Introduction. Assume S’s
manager, M, has leased prisoners from a local prison run by a relative, and
it is common in S’s nation both to use leased prison labor and to tolerate
intra-family dealing. Both are, however, violations of Schedule P in the SCA
between S and B. B is embarrassed when the facts are revealed and seeks
an injunction to enforce Schedule P and stop S from this practice.

82. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
83. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 2948.4 (3d ed. 2013). The treatise continues:
Thus, when granting preliminary relief, courts frequently emphasize that the
public interest will be furthered by the injunction. Conversely, preliminary relief
will be denied if the court finds that the public interest would be injured were an
injunction to be issued . . . . If the court finds there is no public interest supporting
preliminary relief, that conclusion also supports denial of any injunction, even if
the public interest would not be harmed by one. Consequently, an evaluation of
the public interest should be given considerable weight in determining whether a
motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted.
Id.
84. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 978 (“Actual specific performance should be
awarded unless a special moral, policy, or experiential reason suggests otherwise in a
given class of cases . . . .”).
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B may start by pointing to language adapted from the MCCs, that the
parties “agree that . . . the public interest would be served by injunctive
and other equitable relief.”85 S may respond by producing an expert
witness who explains that local law and custom tolerate S’s conduct, and
it is therefore consistent with local public policy.86 B may then produce
an expert witness from a watchdog group who testifies to the opposite
effect. S may retort by arguing that an injunction halting the use of
prisoners would force S to shut down, leaving all of its workers—some
of whom are not leased inmates—out of work, a point to which B and its
experts may have no good response.
At this point, it should be apparent that from a U.S. perspective, there
are competing public interest goals at stake, and that some of them will
be virtually impenetrable to a U.S. judge. On one hand, there is a strong
public interest in assuring the decent treatment of workers and (perhaps)
in eschewing the use of prison labor. On the other hand, courts are wary
of taking action that may have the effect of eliminating jobs.87
And, this assumes that a U.S. sense of public interest is appropriate.
But why should we assume that? Even if, as the hypothetical stipulates,
the parties have chosen U.S. law, that does not necessarily mean that
they have chosen U.S. public policy. Indeed, B may have bargained for
the HR terms in Schedule P precisely because it understood that public
policy in S’s location tolerated conduct considered normatively
offensive in the United States. To ask a court to make these choices
risks entangling the court not only in the business and affairs of the
parties, but also the public policies of their respective nations.
In the face of these difficulties, a court may be tempted to do
nothing. But this would permit S to shirk its responsibilities, to
embarrass B, and to harm those the HR term sought to protect. While
85. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 3, at 1102.
86. S may also point out that leasing prison labor remains a feature of the U.S.
economy. See Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination
Against the Formerly Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2018)
(“[P]rivate corporations rely on and profit from low-wage prison labor to argue that
the state penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for
contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison labor must
revoke policies that bar employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release.”).
87. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to
enjoin operation of a cement plant that employed over three hundred people); see also
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) (refusing to enjoin
pollution from municipal sewer plant and stating that “[w]here an important public
interest would be prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may be
compelling”) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
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B may have other remedies, including a liquidation of damages and
indemnification, those will not necessarily have any greater bite than
specific relief. And, while B could walk away, rescission may have little
remedial effect. Switching to a new supplier is likely to raise B’s costs
and may leave S free to continue to use forced labor.
The bottom line, then, is that specific relief to enforce the remedial
provisions of the MCCs presents a serious problem: courts will find
these terms difficult to use to remedy breach of HR terms, regardless
of the doctrinal path taken. Moreover, these paths provide little
guidance for judges who may understandably fear forcing individuals to
work (or to fire employees on uncertain grounds) or becoming
entangled in problems that they feel are beyond their power or
expertise. But this then invites a more basic question: If courts may not
enforce specific relief for breach of HR terms, why use the MCCs at all?
III. RESTRUCTURING AND RELATIONALISM
As is often the case with contract terms, there is usually life beyond the
black letter law. In the case of specific relief for breach of HR terms, that
life may emanate from an analogy to the work courts do in institutional
reform litigation and may reflect the relational effects that specific
performance terms can have, independent of their doctrinal value.
A. Institutional Reform Litigation
Although courts addressing contract disputes may not immediately
see it this way, problems presented by the breach of HR terms in supply
chain agreements will share certain important characteristics with
litigants’ demands in institutional reform litigation (IRL).88
Institutional reform, or “public law” litigation, uses courts to correct
the behavior of errant public agencies such as police departments,
child-welfare systems, and public schools.89 Structural injunctions in
this context address a broad range of the operations of government
agency defendants. These decrees are most strongly identified with
civil rights claims, but they can be found in other areas.90 These
88. The discussion in this subsection draws on Kathleen G. Noonan, Jonathan C.
Lipson & William H. Simon, Reforming Institutions: The Judicial Function in Bankruptcy
and Public Law Litigation, 94 IND. L.J. 491, 493–94 (2019); see also Fiss, supra note 15.
89. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1303–04, 1303 n.93 (1976) (noting that public law litigation molds public
perception of the legal system).
90. They have occurred in many complex environmental controversies. E.g.,
CHARLES M. HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR: COURTS, DOLPHINS, AND IMPERILED
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litigations are most closely identified with the federal courts, but a
substantial number of structural decrees have emerged from state
courts, including some of the most ambitious.91
Like all forms of specific relief, IRL asks a court to order a party to
do something, or to refrain from doing something, or some of both.92
Like the Termination Powers under the Model Contract Clauses, the
“something” in IRL is likely to involve governance and management of
the defendant. In both IRL and HR terms, the underlying breach
probably involves a failure of assurances (whether through positive law
or contract) about normatively sensitive matters, such as the treatment
of workers or the environment. In both cases, ordinary remedies, in
particular money damages, are unlikely to be satisfactory. While IRL
does not involve formal contract, courts in both contexts grapple with
failed promises that reflect contested public policy choices and try to
craft a set of workable remedies acceptable to the parties and those
affected by their undertakings.
In most cases, IRL results not in a simple injunction enforcing a
governmental obligation, or enjoining a governmental practice, but
instead a consent decree negotiated by the parties against the
backdrop of the threat of litigation or a deliberate judicial decision to
ignore a material grievance.93 In its earlier days, consent decrees were
often a collection of many specific rules. A decree with respect to
prison conditions might, for example, specify the minimum space for

WATERS 3 (2005) [hereinafter HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR] (discussing the
court-induced clean-up of Boston Harbor). They also have a long lineage in antitrust
law. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE (2007) (focusing on the history of consent decree ligation
in antitrust law). And they have some resemblance to recent practice in which
corporations agree to submit to monitoring and to adopt compliance procedures in
return for deferral of prosecution for violation of, for example, the securities laws or
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 240, 267 (2014).
91. E.g., Perez v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Mass. 1980) (approving
decree reforming the Boston Housing Authority); HAAR, MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR,
supra note 90, at 3 (noting that the Boston Harbor clean-up was judicially supervised);
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 8–9
(1996) (discussing the decades-long judicial efforts to induce reform of exclusionary
zoning practices in New Jersey).
92. See Chayes, supra note 89, at 1292 (discussing the importance of equitable relief
in public law litigation).
93. See generally Noonan, Lipson & Simon, supra note 88, at 527.
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cells or the temperature of water in the showers.94 Modern decrees
may still contain some such rules, but they tend to focus on general
management functions of self-monitoring, assessment, transparency,
and accountability, often derived through agreement of the parties,
expert guidance, or both.95 An important goal of the decree is a
higher-functioning organization that is sufficiently stable to selfcorrect based on a commitment to, and investment in, ongoing
internal quality improvement practices and policies.96
The core requirements of framework decrees concern management
practices of policymaking, monitoring, and reassessment. While each
of these may have different characteristics in IRL than they would in
disputes over the breach of HR terms, it is not hard to imagine courts
using these techniques to address the breach of human rights or other
terms involving social, economic, or environmental welfare. In the
event of a dispute over breach of HR terms, the Model Contract
Clauses on specific relief will facilitate each.
The use of a specific enforcement mechanism in the SCA will, for
example, signal a policy commitment by the seller to do (or to refrain
from doing) certain activities. Obviously, breach calls its commitment
to that policy into question, but to have articulated it in the first
instance provides a basis from which a court and the parties may craft
statements of policy that the parties consider workable.
Monitoring may be equally important. IRL consent decrees often
provide that the defendant agrees that a third-party expert will have
access to the defendant’s operations and personnel, such as front-line
staff, in order to determine how underlying problems arise, whether
the proposed remedies in the consent decree are effective and, if not,
insights into how to modify the decree to increase its likelihood of
success.97 Because the monitor is appointed by the court, she is likely
less susceptible to bias than a party-appointed expert. Because her

94. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 40–41 (1998)
(discussing decrees that “specify many requirements in . . . painstaking or excruciating
detail[, including] the wattage of the light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of showers,
and the caloric content of meals”).
95. See, e.g., Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare
State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 524 (2009)
(explaining the evolution of decrees in the context of child welfare cases).
96. See id. at 530–31 (discussing past problems with poor functioning decrees).
97. See Noonan, Lipson & Simon, supra note 88, at 530.
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appointment would be in a consent decree, a party’s refusal to
cooperate with the monitor may be grounds for a finding of contempt.
The Model Contract Clauses do not provide for third-party
monitoring, but could easily do so. There is a growing field of experts
who monitor companies for human rights compliance.98 If (or to the
extent) parties do not contract for a human-rights monitor, a court that
seeks to craft a consent decree may look to certification regimes that
have already begun to develop in this context to guide the monitor’s
work. For example, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) provides its own certification specifically dedicated to social
responsibility (ISO 26000).99 Many organizations indicate that they can
certify companies and factories in these standards.100 These include but
are not limited to: SGS International Certification services,101 DNV Det
Norske Veritas,102 BVQI Bureau Veritas Quality International,103 Intertek
Testing Services,104 and TUV Rheinland Ltd.105
This monitoring and certification function then makes it possible
for the parties to assess and reassess compliance with the goals of the
98. See, e.g., ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
https://www.c2ccertified.org/get-certified/product-certification (last visited June 1,
2019) (providing businesses guidance on how to “operate in a socially responsible way”).
Of course, certification programs do not always work. See Jonathan Webb, Supply Chain
Audits Work for Corporations, but Not the Planet, Says New Report, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2017,
11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ jwebb/2017/01/16/supply-chain-auditswork-for-corporations-but-not-the-planet-says -new-report (arguing that compliance
certification of corporations is ultimately ineffective because facilities that pass
compliance audits may still have substantial human rights violations).
99. Id.
100. SA 8000—Social Accountability Certification, SGS, https://www.sgs.com/en
/sustainability/social-sustainability/audit-certification-and-verification/sa-8000-certifi
cation-social-accountability (last visited June 1, 2019).
101. See id. (noting that an organization can certify to SA 8000 with an SGS audit).
102. Corporate Sustainability in DNV GL, DNV GL, https://www.dnvgl.com/about/
sustainability (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that DNVL GL’s businesses are certified
according to ISO 9001 standard and work toward sustainable development goals).
103. See Social Responsibility: Strengthen Your Company’s Reputation, BUREAU VERITAS
CERTIFICATION, https://www.bureauveritas.com/home/about-us/our-business/certifi
cation/sustainability/social-responsibility (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that Bureau
Veritas is an independent organization that performs social responsibility audits).
104. See Certification, INTEREK, http://www.intertek.com/certification (last visited
June 1, 2019) (advertising that Interek offers certification programs for environmental
and social accountability compliance).
105. See Certification and Auditing Services for Social Responsibility, TÜV RHEINLAND,
https://www.tuv.com/usa/en/social-responsibility.html (last visited June 1, 2019)
(offering services to assess and certify companies’ compliance with social responsibility
and fair working conditions).
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original HR term. In IRL, for example, the Seattle police settlement
prescribes creation of a Community Police Commission with broad
representation to review performance data and recommend policy
changes.106 Ecosystem decrees sometimes mandate increased use of
“adaptive management.”107 For example, the San Joaquin River
Restoration decree altered the defendants’ water management practices
to require a more rapid and nuanced response to indications of danger
to the fish population.108
The emphasis on provisionality and reassessment leads some courts
to mandate explicit experimentation. The New York police decree
required the defendant to undertake a one-year “pilot project” with
patrol officers wearing body-worn cameras in one precinct in each of
the city’s five boroughs.109 At the end of the year, the monitor was
directed to report on results and deliberate with the parties over
whether the practice should be adopted generally.110
In none of these examples do courts in IRL manage or direct the
operations of a defendant agency. Instead, the consent decree
provides a framework of procedures by which the parties can identify
shared goals, mechanisms for determining progress toward those
goals, and options in the event the defendant fails to achieve the
agreed goals. It is not hard to imagine a court asked to specifically
enforce HR terms in supply chain agreements taking analogous steps.
It may not actually enforce the terms as written, but instead use them
as a basis for crafting performative remedies that are realistic. The
judicial experience in IRL may provide a template for judges in cases
involving specific performance of HR terms.

106. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at ¶¶
3–12, 119–25, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. July 27,
2012). The DOJ’s Principles for Promoting Police Integrity—which is a starting point for
remedial design in many cases—demand continuous review of various data to
determine “whether any revisions to training or practices are necessary.” U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 5 (2001).
107. See SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION
PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2010), https://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/includes
/documentShow.php?Doc_ID=7569. “Adaptive management is an approach allowing
decision makers to take advantage of a variety of strategies and techniques that are adjusted,
refined, and/or modified based on an improved understanding of system dynamics.” Id.
108. See id.
109. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
110. Id.
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Indeed, future iterations of the Model Contract Clauses might
include terms which designate a particular monitor in advance of
breach, or who will inspect upon a claim of breach. It may specify steps
the parties agree to take in order to remediate the breach, such as
improved training or certification by front-line or other relevant
personnel. It may provide feedback mechanisms under which parties
can then assess the efficacy (or not) of the steps thus taken.111
B. Relationalism
A central feature of any consent decree must be “consent”—that is,
both parties must agree to the resolution embodied in the decree. It
is easy to assume that if a seller breached HR terms in a supply chain
agreement, it may have little interest in becoming party to a consent
decree. This is certainly possible, and in that event, the buyer is left to
whatever litigation options it has. If the seller believes that the buyer
can make no progress in obtaining any remedy for breach, it is unlikely
to come to the table, at which point rescission probably will be the
buyer’s best (and perhaps most realistic) remedy.
But this also assumes that the seller is willing to sacrifice its
relationship with the buyer, and perhaps other similarly situated
buyers. This assumption may apply only to the most strategic and
cynical sellers, in which case there are no options other than litigating
and walking away. But supply chain agreements are usually relational
contracts, meaning agreements that are deliberately open-ended and
flexible, intended not to be one-off affairs but the basis for sharing risks
and rewards over a sustained period.112

111. Such terms may be similar to those identified by Bernstein in her recent study
of Midwestern Original Equipment Manufacturers. See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond
Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 563 (2015).
112. The literature on relational contracting is too large to cite here usefully. Works
relevant to this paper include: id. at 566 (quoting Master Supply Agreement, HARLEY
DAVIDSON (Nov. 2004), https://www.h-dsn.com/genbus/PublicDocServlet?docID=
22&docExt (“Th[is] [supply agreement] . . . describes in general terms how we work
together with our suppliers . . . . [It] is not a long-term commitment; rather it is a
commitment about how we will operate in the long-term.”); Amy H. Kastely, The Right
to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the
Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 615 n.45 (1988) (citing Richard M.
Brown, Specific Performance in a Planned Economy, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS DELIVERED
AT THE EIGHT ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 35, 37 (Jacob S.
Ziegel ed., 1980) (observing that multinational supply agreements may be relational
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Specific relief plays a special role in thinking about relational
contracts. Its directness and simplicity are generally thought to
promote the formation and management of more fruitful
relationships than money damages. While negotiation over specific
relief terms may be more costly than no negotiation at all—meaning,
the default remedy of damages—the burden of negotiating these
terms may be offset by the benefits of clarity.113 Considering the
possibility that HR terms will be specifically enforced is likely to lead
parties to take such terms more seriously than if they thought the only
remedy available would be rescission or money damages. Given the
uncertainty of the dollar amounts at issue, that remedy may be none at
all, in which event the HR term would be wasted. Specific relief terms
may thus increase efficiency as they force parties to negotiate more
thoroughly and carefully with one another.114
Moreover, specific relief terms may compel parties to resolve their
differences more quickly than would recourse to default or liquidated
damages. The breaching promisor threatened with a judicial decree
compelling performance is in many cases likely to take that sanction
more seriously than an award of money damages, because damages can
be difficult to determine or to collect.115 While enforcing specific relief
will also not be easy, there is a view that in a broad range of cases,
specific relief terms will induce more efficient and effective postbreach adjustment than damages, even without the adaptations
suggested by IRL-type consent decrees.116

contracts)); see also JOSH WHITFORD, NEW OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING (2005).
113. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1003–04 (1983) (“[A]
carefully conditioned right of specific performance not only restrains evasion but also
selectively filters the potentially opportunistic cases where the obligor’s cost of
performance is substantially greater than the market value of performance.”).
114. See Schwartz, supra note 62, at 291 (arguing that specific relief terms “would minimize
the inefficiencies of under compensation, reduce the need for liquidated damage clauses,
minimize strategic behavior, and save the costs of litigating complex damage issues”).
115. Id. at 291–92.
116. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward A Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1984) (“[U]nder specific
performance post-breach adjustments to all contracts will be resolved in a manner
most likely to lead to the promise being concluded in favor of the party who puts the
highest value on the completed performance and at a lower cost than under any
alternative.”); see also Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1975)
(determining the merits of Laclede’s argument that it is entitled to injunctive relief
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All of this seems especially true in cases involving HR terms in supply
chain agreements among multinational corporations. While some
non-U.S. companies may want or need to shirk contractual promises
to honor HR terms, one can imagine that including specific relief for
breach of such terms might empower other, more willing promisors to
seek to change conditions at home such that they could perform or
develop a second-best remedy to preserve a value-creating relationship.
Having agreed to specific relief would not only alter the promisor’s
relationship with the promisee, but also, potentially, others whose
norms may conflict with the HR term in the SCA.
Crafting more intentionally experimental and incremental terms,
along the lines found in institutional reform litigations, may reinforce
the relational power of specific relief terms. A promisor who has
agreed to the presence of a pre-breach monitor will know that the
promisee has a window into the promisor’s operations that makes
defection difficult and probably enhances the integrity of the
relationship. The promisor that has agreed, ex ante, to a monitor (preor post-breach) should find it difficult to object to a request to
specifically enforce such a provision; a court may view such a
mechanism as an incremental step designed to save the parties’
relationship, and on that ground grant the request.
CONCLUSION
Constructing contract terms to prevent or ameliorate serious social
problems, such as the use of forced labor, is an innovative and
important development in the use of contract. It will present
challenges for contract doctrine and theory. This brief Article has only
scratched the surface of one facet of the problems presented by such
terms, specific relief for their breach.
If nothing else, contract terms to remedy HR abuses are, themselves,
unique, and their breach may well be irreparable in money damages.
I have argued that parties that take such terms seriously should
recognize that they may be doctrinally constrained. Such constraints
should not, however, lead the parties to abandon the terms or specific
relief for their breach. Instead, parties and courts should recognize
the more limited, but still tangible, benefits that such terms can
provide in this context.

rather than damages); E. Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442–43 (S.D.
Fla. 1975) (concluding that specific performance is not an extraordinary remedy).

